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FAULT TREE AND CAUSE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS FOR CONTROL SOFTWARE 
VALIDATION 
Introduction 
In many areas of computer application, safety depends on freedom 
from software error. Examples a-e elevator control, control of 
chemical plants, railway signalling and control, nuclear reactor 
safety systems and aircraft landing systems. For systems such as 
these it is important to be able either to guarantee freedom 
from error, or to be able to reduce the probability of failure 
in operations. For example a nuclear reactor shutdown system 
should fail at a rate which is typically less than once per 10 
program executions. 
Path domain testing [1], [2], [3], [4], comes close to satisfy-
ing the need for a guarantee of freedom from error. If along 
each path through a program a single variable polynomial is com-
puted of maximum order n, then n + 1 tests per path will reveal 
all computation errors. A similar number of tests of domain 
boundaries will detect most control errors, if conditional state-
ment predicates involve only single variables. If several 
variables are involved in path predicates or in path compu-
tations then n tests will not necessarily reveal all errors, 
since an actual path predicate or path computation may corre-
spond coincidentally to the correct predicate or computation for 
all test cases. This will happen if the hypersurfaces for thr. 
actual and correct polynomials touch or cut each other at each 
test point. The probability of this will generally be very low, 
if more than just a i^ rf test points are chosen at random. 
The remaining group of errors undetected by thorough path domain 
testing are missing program paths corresponding to special input 
data cases. To find these, path domain predicates may be com-
pared with formal program specifications [5]. 
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The main advantage of path domain testing, when compared with 
proof of program correctness is avoidance of the need for a for-
mal specification. It is known that provision of formal specifi-
cations is extremely error prone [6]. Additionally, even infor-
mal specifications are subject to error, accounting for some 
50% of failures in operating software. Systematic testing 
overcomes some of these problems, by allowing the programmer to 
deal with program performance on a case by case basis. 
One way of checking the correctness of test outputs in path 
domain testing is to execute the program along with a model of 
the plant to be controllr The model is checked to ensure that 
its performance in respon.s to computer outputs is satisfactory. 
This leads to the arrangement shown in fig. 1. Here the plant 
model provides the specification of correct performance. 
00HT40L. 
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Fig. 1« Arrargement for software testing with a model. 
Fault tree analysis 
Automated fault tree analysis [7.8,9 J makes use of finite state 
models of plant components which are very much like predicate 
trans-'.Jr.M;r3 used in deriving path predicates. Each component is 
described by means of a set of statements, termed mini-fault 
trees, or trie form 
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"if x occurs at the input tc a component, and if the 
state of the component is Y then x* will occur at the 
output of the component, and the new component state 
will be Y'" 
In building up a fault tree a "top event" is chosen within a 
component, generally some undesired event, such as an explosion 
or crash. This event is matched to output events of mini fault 
trees for the component, and any matching mini-fault trees are 
added to the overall fault tree for the system. If there are 
several matching mini-fault trees, they are connected into the 
overall fault tree via an OR gate. 
Having found an initial match, indicating a "first level" cause 
of the top event, in an input, or internal state change event X 
within the component, causes of this event are then sought. If 
X is an internal state change event, mini fault trees with X as 
a resulting event are sought for. If X is an input event, mini 
fault trees providing a cause for X are sought in the components 
connected to that in which X occurs. 
This process is iterated, building up chains of events backwards 
in time. The chains branch via an AND gate whenever both an 
event X and a state Y are required for an event X* to occur. The 
chains branch via an OR gate whenever there are two potential 
ways in which an event X occurs (fig. 2). The process of build-
ing up an event chain terminates when either a "spontaneous" 
event is found (that is one for which no specific further cause 
is defined), or a "normal" event or state is found, that is one 
which will occur frequently during normal operation of a plant. 
The process of building up the fault tree terminates when all 
event chains have been terminated with "normal" or "spontaneous 
events". 
It is necessary to store the state of components as the fault 
tre.3 + a biii.it up, since if two chains, 'anded* together, arrive 
at the same component (due to a feedback or feed forward loop in 
the bystem) tuen the two chains must be checked for compatibil-
ity. They may, for example, require that the component fulfil 
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two mutually exclusive conditions at the same time. If such a 
condition is detected, then the event chains are rejected. 
This building of event chains can be carried out in the forward 
direction, in which case the process is known as consequence 
analysis I*?]. The two processes may be combined into one pro-
cedure, cause consequence analysis, in which the causes and con-
sequences of a single "critical event" are sought. Heuristic 
rules have been devised for systematic selection of critical 
events in plant safety analysis [ II ]. 
Fault tree analysis for software 
The analogy between state transition functions for hardware com-
ponents and predicate transformers can be utilised in building 
up fault trees for combined hardware and software systems. In 
building up the trees, some unwanted event is identified within 
the hardware and event chains are traced which can cause this 
event. When a "computer" component is reached, events at the 
output registers of the computer will be found. The "causes" of 
these are register manipulation statements within the software. 
Chains of "events" within the software are ther. sought by tracing 
changes in program variables from statement to statement using a 
predicate transformer technique, until program inputs are found 
which are necessary for the particular event chain. The chains 
can then be extended once again to hardware, seeking the poten-
tial causes of the program input events found. 
The mini fault tree notation can be applied to individual pro-
gram statements, allowing a uniform process of hardware/software 
fault tree construction. For each statement a set of mini fault 
trees is generated according to the schemes shown in fig. 3. 
These are a modified form of weakest precondition predicate 
transformers used elsewhere in proving program correctness [H]. 
Tho V-rnts" in Lho nrogram iiiini fault trees are statements of 
the form 
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Assignment statement 
at t-1, P(E(x)) 
1 
i 
x := E (x) 
I 
at t P (x) 
x is a free variable represent-
ing the vector of program vari-
able values at different points 
in the program. 
t is a free variable representing 
a pair -"earliest and latest time'.' 
IF statement 
E is an »pression. 
IF B(x) THEN il : SI ELSE 12 z S2 
SI and S2 are any statements 
including compound statements. 
CI and 12 are labels. 
at t - l f B(x) ft Q(x) 
1 
1 
at t , PC = 11 & Q(x) 
! 
SI 
I 
at t , P(x) 
i 
IF ~ -
1 
1 
it t , P(x) 
at t - 1 , B(x) ft R(x) 
1 
1 
at t , PC = 12 ft R(x) 
1 
S2 
1 
a t t , P(x) 
1 
PC i s program 
counter 
Fip. 3. Mini fault trees for basic program statements. 
"at tine t, predicate P becomes true of the program 
variables" 
There are three nain differences in the process of building 
fault trees fcr hardware and software. Firstly, instead of there 
being a simple natch between events and mini fault trees, as for 
hardware, the software mini fault trees may match any predicate. 
Secondly, the mini fault trees, when matched, must be niodified 
by substituting the output predicate into the mini fault tree, 
both at the input and output position. Thirdly, it is generally 
necessary to simplify the predicates representing input and out-
put events in the mini-fault trees. If this simplification re-
sults in the predicate FALSE the event chain is abandoned. 
Note that the form of fault '.ree for IF and WHILE statements 
provides an OR branch for each direction of branching through 
the statement. This ensures that all paths through a program 
will be treated as different branches of the fault tree. This 
has the advantage of ensuring greater understandability, and of 
keeping individual predicates relatively simple. It has the dis-
advantage of producing very large trees in many cases. For this 
reason it h as been found advisable to insist on quite severe 
structuring rules for programs to be used with this technique. -
"Separate (possibly parallel) programs should be provided for 
each separate control or safety function within a computer sys-
tem". This ruin er sures at least that the program paths followed 
are relevant to trit anaJysts safety problem. An alternative 
formulation of the str ucturing criterion can be applied system-
atically. - It" th-:;re ar-3 two program outputs X and Y for which 
the values are functions of sets of inputs I(X) and I(Y), then 
if r (X) n r(Y; is empty, programs producing outputs X and Y 
shoalJ be disjoint. 
Loops and induction 
With loop.- ir. a program, the size of the fault fees produced 
may in-v •. rv '<Ai~ar.. or nay even grow indefinitely. For practical 
pur,^ >scft, tao ru:. .:> r ,1 times the fault tree iterates round a 
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WILE statement 
SI; WEILE B(x) DO S ; S3 
SI 
I 
at t-1, B(x) c P(x) 
1 
¥ 
at t-1 B(x> ft P(x) 
~ ~ z i — ] 
WHILE 
I 
at tf P(x) 
1— 
S3 
SI 
I 
at t-1, B(x) ft Q(x) 
WHILE 
I 
at t-1, B(x) ft Q(x) 
tt 
| at t, Q(x) | 
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program loop must be limitec'. 
Induction can be applied to the fault tree to show that no poss-
ible program inputs lead to a dangerous event, in the following 
way. 
1. It is shown that no dangerous output is produced from 
any input causing zero iterations round a loop. 
2. It is shown that no dangerous outputs are produced from 
any input causing one iteration round a loop. 
3. It is shown that if no dangerous output has been pro-
duced with n iterations around a loop, then no dangerous 
output will be produced with n + 1 iterations. 
This type of proof is aided by the graphic presentation of the 
fault tree. The fault tree branch corresponding to the n + 1 
iteration is generally similar in form or is a simple systematic 
modification of the form of the branch corresponding to the n 
iteration. If the forms can, by logical manipulation, be made 
identical apart from the numerical constant n, then the induc-
tion proof is completed. 
Features of this approach 
The main advantage of the approach outline here is that soft-
ware testing is integrated into plant functional analysis and 
failure analysis. The overall performance of plant and control 
system can be investigated. 
The problem of finding an unequivocal decision about which pro-
gram outputs are "correct", which limits the usefulness of path 
domain testing, are solved with this approach by referring to 
the 'correct' or 'safe' performance of the plant model. 
Problems or specification errors are to a large extent avoided 
witn this approach. l>> formal specification of pre gram require-
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ments need be made, and the "testing" is independent of the pro-
gram specification. The plant component models used are drawn 
from a library of standard models which are tested over a long 
series of analyses. The models are derived by means of a stan-
dardised procedure from physical equations for the components 
[4]. in other words the test is very thorough and is independent 
of the programming process. 
Parallel processing is accounted for by the fault tree method in 
a natural way. 
The major problems with the fault tree approach to software 
validation are the need for inductive proofs for programs with 
loops, (these must be provided by the analyst), and the very 
large size of fault trees formed. It is doubtful whether any 
practical program could be validated as a whole. Rather, it 
seems necessary to break down programs hierarchically, into sub-
routines or modules. 
Given that a proof of freedom from program error is carried 
through using a fault tree approach, one might ask whether any 
errors can remain in the program. Such weak points must arise 
due to some common error in both the programming and plant mod-
elling process. Three obvious sources are errors in the physical 
description of the plant (plant flow sheet), errors in the plant 
construction so that i does not accord with plant design, and 
common misconceptions, shared by the programmer and the plant 
model builder, about the way the plant works. 
Treatment of functions and subroutines 
Given the need for a hierarchical decomposition of the analysis 
task, a question arises, 'how?'. One approach is to analyse 
functions and subroutines separately, and to incorporate these 
direcr..Lj into ;no program descriptions. 
One way oi. doo-ng this is to evaluate the function which a sub-
routine computes and to make use of the functional description 
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Procedure 
| a 
1 
L f . 
CALL 
a t t 
cal l 
Q ( P ( x ) ) 
1 
P (x) 
1 
Q (x) J 
Note: It is necessary to 
evaluate the function 
calculated by P. See fig. 4 
WAIT and SIGNAL statements 
at t' Q(x) 
at t Q(x) 
at t S-"ON 
- I 
V 
WAIT S 
I 
f < t 
J 
Note: other semantics 
for WAIT are possible 
in which processing pro-
ceeds if S is ON. 
at t S-OFF 
lat t, R(x)l 
1 
STGNAL S 
-J 
| at t, R W 
Note: No sharing of 
variables is assumed 
here - each program has 
its own variables. 
at t S-ON 
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Shared variables in critical sections 
SI ; CRITICAL SECTION I WITH V DO S ; S3 
\ r • 
11 
\ at f , Q(x) ] I at t V+FREE1 
' •
 J
 < a—i—c: 
r 
at t, Q(x) 
1*' ,< t J 
1 
at t V+OCCUPIED T\ 
SI 
_ l _ 
a t t , Q(x) 
—izz 
I a t t , Q ( x ) ) 
1 
S 
^ 
a t t , V IS FREE 
1 
| a t t , V-»-OCCUPIED-E| 
1 
[ a t t R(x? 
a t t , R (x)| 
1 
S3 
S2 
a t t v i s OCCUPIED-a 1
 1 ' 
1 
a t t V-+FREE 
n~n 
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FORK and JOIN 
S i FORK SI ; S2 JOIN ; S3 
S 
I 
at f Rl(x) & R2(x) 
at tl, Rl(x) 
SI 
f = MIN(t1|t2) 
1 
[at t2, R2(x) 
S2 
SI 
at t , R(x) 
S2 
1 
at t , R(x) 
- 17 -
of the subroutine in building up the fault tree. A mini fault 
tree for procedure calls without side effects is shown in fig. 
3. The function calculated by a procedure can be found by conse-
quence analysis/symbolic execution, applying the rules shown in 
fig. 4. These work by finding the value of the program variable 
vector after execution of a program statement, as a function of 
the program var'able vector prior to execution of the statement. 
Rules for finding these functions for individual statements are 
then applied iteratively. 
Predicate transformer rules for strongest post conditions of 
x = = X 
o 
x = F (xQ) 
1 
x := B(x) 
l 
x = E(F(xQ)) 
(x = F(x o) 
IF B(X) THEN S= ELSE S2 
X = IF B(F(XQ)) & SPC(Sl,F(xQ)) ELSE SPC (S2>F (xQ) ) 
X = F(xo)l 
T 
WHILE B(x) DO S 
I 
X = IF B F(xo) THEN F (xQ) 
ELSEIF B F(xQ) & B (SPC (K,F (XQ) ) ) THEN SPC(S,F(x )) 
ELSEIF B F(x.) & B(SPC(S,F(XQ))) & B (SPC(S,SPC(S,F (x ) ) ) ) 
THEN SPC(S,SPC(S,F(X ) )) 
ELSEIF 
Interrupts 
Three kinds of interrupts can be distinguished 
- SiGNALS in which one process waits for an interrupt 
from another before restarting 
- EXCEPTIONS in which a program halts for some error re-
covery action in case some exceptional con-
dition is met 
- ATTENTIONS in which a running program is halted by another 
process, and is either STOPped, MODIFIEd, or 
SUSPENDed awaiting a further RESUME command. 
The first of these can be treated in the same way as WAIT and 
SIGNAL described earlier. 
EXCEPTIONS can be treated readily in mini-fault trees by attach-
ing an additional predicate to each tree as follows. 
P(E(x)) 
~ T — 
x := E(x) 
EXEP(x) & P(E(x)) v EXEP(x) 
I 
x := E(x) unless EXCEP(x) 
(P(x) 
i 
For STOP type interrupts the modification is as follows 
a t 
L, 
t-
U 
4. 
\ 
S 
1 
P(x) 
= * 
at t-1 P(x) 
p. 
INTERRUPT RErSflNS 
( a t t Q ( x ) | 
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For MODIFY interrupt (in which processing resumes after modi-
fication) the transformation is 
at t -1 P(x) 
1 
o 
j a t t - 1 P(x) 
1 
INTERRUPT 
REMAINS OFF 
1 . , 1 
S } 
» | a t t Q(x)| 
y 
I V> |at t Q(x)j 
at t - l P ' ( x ) INTERRUPT 
•* ON 
1 . . » 
^ y 
P(x) = W?(S,Q(x)) P'(x) = WP(S,WP(F,Q(x)) where F is the func-
tion computed by the interrupt routine. 
For SUSPEND interrupts the modification is as follows 
(at t-1 P(x)| 
[at t Q(x)' 
at t-1 P(x) 
—c= } — I 
INTERRUPTS 
REMAIN OFF 
Z3 
* 
at t'P(x) 
\at t Q(x)( 
I at *• RESUME1 
. I ' 
y 
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